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personally receive the proceeds . 7 But, this was not the settlor's intention; we have shown that he had the association in mind when he
created the trust and not the individual members. It would be his
intention that if and when the trust was properly terminated the proceeds should go to the association and to no one else.
It would seem that to recognize an unincorporated association as a
separate entity capable of holding equitable title would be the most
simple and direct solution of our problem.2 8 The settlor's intentions
would be satisfied since the beneficial interest is in the association
where he intended it to be and the trust will exist as long as he intended. It will be subject to the will of the association in exactly the
manner which he had in mind, i.e., the association can control the
trust according to its customary procedures without any objections by
individual members of infringment of their "personal rights." The title
vests once and for all in the association and is not even ambulatory.
The rule against perpetual trusts is not violated because the unincorporated association, as in the case of corporations, should be permitted to be the beneficiary of a private trust despite the fact that it
might exist in perpetuity.29 We assume, of course, that the trust could
not of its terms be one of perpetual indestructibility. A trust set up
for the benefit of an unincorporated association should conform to the
normal rules governing private trusts so far as destructibility is concemed.30 The mere fact that the trust has a potential existence of infinity should not vitiate it.
In conclusion it would seem that to recognize the ability of an
unincorporated association to be its own beneficiary is the most desirable solution of the problems presented by such private trusts. It
squares with the intention of the parties involved and it is the easiest
to legally justify and administer. Unquestionably it represents the
modem attitude toward unincorporated associations.
Ciius N. CArams
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-PROTECTION ACCORDED THE
OFFICER WHO ARRESTS UNDER A DEFECTIVE WARRANT
In any examination of the effect of an arrest under a defective warrant upon the rights of the arresting officer it is necessary to give some
consideration to the nature of the warranti Though there are numerous
'As was done to no avail by the individual members in Crawford v. Gross,
140 Pa. 297, 21 A. 356 (1891).
See cases supra note 4.
See I Sco-r, THE LAw OF TRUSTS 589 (1939).

Ibid. at 392-393.
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requisites which a valid warrant must meet,1 these requisites, it is
believed, may be broken down into five basic requirements. A warrant to be valid must: (1) satisfy the requirements of jurisdiction;
(2) set forth substantially the nature of the offense with which the
accused is charged; (3) contain a reasonable description of, or name,
the person to be arrested; (4) be issued on oath; and (5) be issued
upon probable cause. The last three requisites are covered in the
Constitution of the United States in the following words:
[N]o warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing . . . the
persons ... to be seized.2

Various state constitutions contain similar provisions.3
Considerable difficulty is encountered when one attempts to discuss
the various defects in a warrant. Clearly a warrant is either valid or
invalid, i.e. defective. The courts, however, have recognized that
there may be two types of defects-those apparent on the face of the
process and those which, though present, are not apparent on the face
of the warrant. In discussing the rights of the parties involved in an
attempted arrest under a defective warrant it is necessary that a distinction be made between these two types of defects. Those warrants
in which the defect is apparent on the face of the process will hereafter be designated patently defective warrants; and those warrants
which, though valid and fair on their face, are burdened with some
4
unseen defect will be called latently defective warrants.
A duly authorized officer who executes a latently defective warrant
in a proper manner is protected to the same degree as if he were
executing a valid warrant. 5 In Bullock v. State where a constable was
killed while executing a warrant regular on its face, but which had
been sworn out for illegal purposes, it was said:
[If the process be regular and legal upon its face, and within the
jurisdiction of the magistrate to issue, the officer will be protected in
its service....'
'RESTATmEENT, CRnN~. AL PROCEDURE, sec. 3 (1931).
U. S. CONST. AMEND. IV.

' ORFIELD, CuamiNAL PRoCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 10 (1947).
'See generally note, 34 Ky. L. J. 73 (1945). An officer's obvious right to

arrest when armed with a valid warrant will not be discussed herein, nor will the
situation be treated where an arrest is attempted under a defective warrant, when
such an arrest would have been legal without any warrant whatsoever. The problem to be discussed arises when an arrest which requires a warrant is attempted
under a warrant which is defective in some way.
r State v. Gupton, 166 N.C. 257, 80 S.E. 989 (1914); State v. Henry Jones,
88 N.C. Rep. 648 (1883); RESTATEmENT, TORTS, sec. 124, comment (a) (1934).
'Bullock v. State, 65 N. J. L. 557, -, 47 Atl. 62, 67 (1900).
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The law is well settled that for the proper execution of such process
the officer incurs no liability. 7 This rule is the most rational which
could be reached. An officer is duty bound, and his duty is wholly inconsistent with any rule which would require him to delve into the
8
circumstances behind every warrant he might be directed to execute.
In Hoppe v. Klopperich where it was alleged that a warrant for the
plaintiff's arrest was procured knowingly, wrongfully, maliciously, and
without probable cause, it was said:
It was the sheriff's imperative duty to execute the warrant,

. .

. and

he was not obliged to go behind warrant to determine the validity of
the prior proceedings....

Further, under the majority rule, the mere fact that the officer knows
that the warrant was obtained for an unlawful purpose, or was illegally
issued, does not give him the right to refuse to execute it.10 The officer
must be governed by the instrument alone.
While an officer is protected against defects which are not apparent
on the face of the warrant, he is bound to know if it lacks the formal
requirements of such instruments or contains any other defects which
are apparent on its face. Thus, it is said that "when the warrant fails
to state some fact which by common law or statute is required to be
stated therein, the warrant lacks a formal requirement and one serving
a process is at his peril bound to know the formal requirements of a
valid warrant." " An example of a formal requirement which generally, by statute, must appear on the warrant, is the oath. If it is
issued without recital of such oath, it is patently defective and all
persons concerned in an arrest thereunder will be liable for an illegal
arrest. 12 This recital of an oath, however, is probably not necessary
under the statutes of some jurisdictions.' 8

It may further safely be said that the officer is bound to know
that the offense for which the warrant is issued is an offense within
the jurisdiction of the issuing authority, that is to say an offense over

which the issuing officer has jurisdiction.' 4 A process which shows on
its face that it was issued for an offense not within the jurisdiction of
v. Lapham, 196 Iowa 745, 195 N.W. 285 (1928).
'Wilson
8
Spear v. State, 120 Ala. 351, 25 So. 46 (1899); Malone v. Carey, 17 Cal.
App. 92d 505, 62 P. 2d 166 (1936).
Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, -, 28 N.W. 2d 780, 789 (1947).
' Watson v. Watson, 9 Conn. 140 (1882); State v. Weed, 21 N.H. 262
(1850); CLARK, CRnvmUAL PRocanunE 48 (2d ed. 1918).
REsTATEmENT, TORTS, sec. 124, comment (b) (1934).
'Grumon v. Raymond and Betts, I Conn. 40 (1814); Bissell v. Gold, 1
Wend. (N. Y.) 213 (1828).
CLARK, CRmnnNAL PRoCEDurm 85 (2d ed. 1918).
ANT, TORTS, sec. 124, comment (c) and (d) (1934).
R1TA'J
S
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the issuing body is also considered patently defective and the officer
serving it is denied the protection generally given him.
Another factor which must here be considered is the requirement
as to the name or description of the party to be arrested. The warrant,
in this respect, must be specific and correctly name the person to be
arrested, or if his name is unknown it must so state and must describe
him so that he may be identified with reasonable certainty. 15 Thus, a
general warrant to apprehend all persons suspected of a crime is a
patently defective warrant in the execution of which an officer will not
be protected. 1
As stated above, one of the fundamental requisites of a warrant is
that it sufficiently charge the crime for which the warrant is issued.
However, the officer is not bound to sit as a court of appeals over the
issuing body, but is entitled to assume that the issuer knows the law
and is not exceeding his authority, and therefore to assume that the
conduct described constitutes a crime at common law or a crime arising
from statute, 17 unless the offense charged or the acts alleged would
clearly indicate to a reasonable man in the offlicer's position that no
crime had occurred. In State v. Jones it was said:
[I]f the warrant is for an offense within the jurisdiction of the justice,
and the crime charged is described with sufficient precision to apprize
the accused of the offense with which he is charged, the warrant is
good and will protect the officer.'

This rule appears to the writer to be more logical than a rule which
would require the executing officer to know thoroughly all the technical elements necessary to constitute each crime which might be
charged in warrants directed to him. An officer of the law is not a
"barrister" and should not be held to the knowledge of one in the legal
profession.
Thus, it may be said by way of summary that in the proper execution of a latently defective warrant, that is, a warrant fair on its face,
an officer is protected; but an officer is bound to know the formal re'Johnston v. Riley, 13 Ga. 97, 137 (1853); Commonwealth v. Crotty, 10
Allen (Mass.) 403 (1865); but it has been held that under statutes allowing
amendments in criminal proceedings and process where a person has been arrested
under a complaint and warrant giving the wrong name, they may be amended so
as to give the name correctly; Keehn v. Stien, 72 Wis. 186, 39 N.W. 372 (1888).
Grumon v. Raymond and Betts, 1 Conn. 40 (1814).
1
RE STATE M NT, ToRTS,

sec. 124, comment (j) (1934); but see Reichman v.

Harris, 252 F. 371 (1918); Nolan v. State, 24 Ala. 672 (1854); Luech v. Heisler,
87 Wis. 644, 58 N.W. 1101 (1894) where it was said at p. 1102, "The law under
which the process issues is part of the process and the officer is bound to know the
law."
"'State v. Jones, 88 N.C. 648, 656 (1883); see also Boyd v. State, 17 Ga. 184

(1855).
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quirements of a valid warrant, and is bound to know the jurisdiction
of the issuing body. If one or more of the formal requirements are
missing, or if the issuing body does not have jurisdiction over the'
offense for which the process was issued, and such fact appears on the
face of the warrant, the warrant is rendered patently "defective, and
the officer is denied the protection given him in the execution of a
latently defective warrant.
It is interesting to observe the relation of this analysis of patent
and latent defects with the fundamental requisites of warrants of
arrest as provided by the federal and state constitutions. These requisites are: (1) probable cause, (2) an oath, and (3) a description of
the accused. It is arguable that if any of these requisites is lacking
in a warrant of arrest it would constitute a patent defect. But this has
not been found to be completely true. [under the above discussion.]
As was stated above, the officer is only bound by what appears on the
face of the instrument. If the process were not supported by oath,
for example, and this factual deficiency were not apparent from a
reading of the warrant, the officer would nevertheless be protectedyet one of the constitutional requisites would be lacking.
On the other hand it has been found that there are some fundamental requisites not specifically demanded by the federal and state
constitutions. For example, an officer is bound, at his peril, to know
that the offense charged is one over which the issuing body has jurisdiction, and this element is completely omitted from the constitutional provision. Thus, it may be concluded that in determining
whether a warrant is patently or latently defective, and therefore
whether or not an officer is protected in its execution, the courts cannot rely upon the constitutional provisions as an exclusive test.
It would be of value to consider, finally, whether the existing rules
are fundamentally sound in the protection they bestow upon the arresting officer and the public. An officer can only be held to a standard
that can reasonably be expected of one who is admittedly not particularly trained in the technicalities of the law and to a standard
which is not inconsistent with the salary which the average officer receives. On the other hand the public should not be unduly and unnecessarily exposed to arrest under defective warrants. There must
be a balancing of these two interests, and it is in establishing this
balance that we encounter an ever present social problem.
It is submitted that, all things considered, the existing rules in some
cases hold the officer to a higher standard than he should reasonably
be expected to meet. Consequently, there are probably more illegal
arrests than is commonly supposed. Can this situation be alleviated by

NoT'rs AND Comam's

raising the level of the officer by an enforced system of education, or
by paying the officer a higher salary? Both remedies would seem desirable, but whatever the solution, attention should be given to the
problem, and the situation should be re-examined from time to time.
C

mm
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THE THEORIES OF JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS
The purpose of this note is to discuss the various theories by which
the courts give effect to the intention with which a deposit in a joint
account is made where one person contributes the entire amount deposited and expressly provides for the right of survivorship. The cases
suggest three principal theories which will be examined. Some courts
sustain the account on the theory that a joint tenancy with survivorship is created by a gift inter vivos, while others rely on the notion
that the deposit results in a third party beneficiary type contract with
the bank. A third group base the validity of these deposits on
statutory provisions which explicitly authorize the deposit or raise a
presumption in favor of its validity. The discussion will be confined
to the rights created between the joint depositors since the rights and
liabilities of the bank normally are prescribed by statute and present
no substantial problem.'
GIFr THEORY

Those jurisdictions which classify the joint account as a gift creating
joint ownership, require that two essential elements of a valid gift inter
vivos be present: an adequate manifestation of donative intent, and a
delivery.2 They do not require a manual delivery of possession to the
donee, however, since this is impossible in this type of transaction.
The physical act of depositing money under this theory amounts to a
delivery to the bank for the donee and is sufficient. Neither is it required that the donor relinquish complete control of the subject matter by creating exclusive control in the donee. Since a surrender of
complete control would deny the donor-depositor the right to withdraw money from the account, the cases hold that the delivery requirement is met if there is an adequate manifestation of intention to relinquish exclusive control.3 In other words, the creation of joint con-

' For a compilation of statutes, see note, 9 CoRNEiL. L. Q. 48, 49 n. 6

(1923).
'Bachmann v. Reardon, 188 Conn. 665, 88 A. 2d 391 (1952). For additional
cases on this theory see annotation, 149 A. L. R. 879, 880 (1944).
'Wilt v. Brokaw, 196 F. 2d 69 (7th Cir. 1952).

